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Abstract This paper examines the effect of the
number of correspondent financial institutions for
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at the first
settlement of accounts on subsequent firm bankruptcy
risk using survival models. We use a unique firm-level
data set of 2667 unlisted SMEs incorporated in Japan
between April 2003 and December 2009. Moreover, in
the nature of the analysis, we focus on firms that
transact with at least one financial institution and
disclose information about profit at the first settlement.
We find that more correspondent financial institutions
for SMEs at the first settlement increase subsequent
firm bankruptcy risk. Furthermore, we check the
robustness of this result with the method of instru-
mental variables (IV methods) and obtain similar
results; in other words, the risk of firm bankruptcy
increases with the number of correspondent financial
institutions.
Keywords Correspondent financial institutions 
Multiple bank relationships  Bankruptcy  Small and
medium-sized enterprises
JEL Classifications G21  G33  L26  M13 
M21
1 Introduction
As indicated by Carter and Van Auken (2006) and
Franco and Haase (2010), business continuity for
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) largely
depends on whether they receive sufficient support
from their correspondent financial institutions. How-
ever, the strategies available to SMEs to receive
support from financial institutions are limited. In
reality, they cannot actively address the problems that
hinder support from financial institutions, such as
asymmetric information and incomplete contracts. In
addition, it is difficult for SMEs to prove that they are
promising enterprises and attract investment from
financial institutions.
However, there are strategies that SMEs can
proactively control, and the choice of the number of
correspondent financial institutions is one such exam-
ple. In most cases, the right to decide the number of
correspondent financial institutions rests not with
financial institutions but with client firms. Numerous
studies have examined the choice of the number of
correspondent financial institutions as this is an
important part of the business strategy of SMEs and
entrepreneurs.
Here, we review the literature on the subject of the
number of correspondent financial institutions, includ-
ing multiple bank relationships. First, we begin with
how multiple bank relationships affect hold-up prob-
lems and credit availability of firms. A single bank
relationship causes an information monopoly by a
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specific financial institution, and thus causes hold-up
problems (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992). In addition,
multiple bank relationships worsen firms’ credit
availability (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Ongena and
Smith 2000). However, Ongena and Smith (2000) also
show that multiple bank relationships can reduce the
hold-up problems. Moreover, Herna´ndez-Ca´novas
and Martı´nez-Solano (2007) argue that the SMEs that
transact with fewer financial intermediaries have more
financial restraints.
Next, we review the literature on the theoretical
risks of firm bankruptcy. Multiple bank relationships
make it difficult for creditors to coordinate with each
other, particularly in the case of business restructuring,
and thus increase the risk for customer firms (Dewa-
tripont and Maskin 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein
1996; Foglia et al. 1998; Brunner and Krahnen 2008).
In contrast, some studies have shown that multiple
bank relationships reduce the theoretical firm bank-
ruptcy risk. For example, Detragiache et al. (2000)
show that multiple bank relationships can ensure a
more stable supply of credit and reduce the probability
of an early liquidation of the project. Furthermore,
Guiso and Minetti (2010) find a negative correlation
between borrowing differentiation and restructuring
costs.
These studies examine the impact of multiple bank
relationships on hold-up problems, credit availability
of firms, and theoretical firm bankruptcy risk. How-
ever, the more important thing for the business
manager is the actual business performance. Of
course, there exist studies on the relationship between
the number of correspondent financial institutions and
business performance. For instance, Degryse and
Ongena (2001) investigate the effects of multiple
bank relationships on sales profitability employing a
sample of listed firms and find a negative correlation
between the two. Furthermore, Castelli et al. (2012)
examine how the number of bank relationships affects
firm performance using a unique data set of Italian
small firms and indicate that an increase in the number
of correspondent financial institutions reduces firms’
financial performance, such as the return on equity and
return on assets.
As shown above, some studies describe the rela-
tionship between the number of correspondent finan-
cial institutions and business performance. However,
to the best of our knowledge, no study has empirically
examined the impact of the number of correspondent
financial institutions on firm bankruptcy in spite of its
importance. For this reason, this paper empirically
investigates the effect of the number of correspondent
financial institutions on firms’ subsequent bankruptcy
risk.1 In addition, it uses unlisted SMEs just after
incorporation as the sample because of the following
reason: as referred in many studies, such as Mata
(1994) and Song et al. (2008), firms are most likely to
go bankrupt within a few years of incorporation; thus,
clarifying the effect during this period is important in
terms of providing a new strategy for business
managers and entrepreneurs to avoid bankruptcy in
the early stages of the entrepreneurial process.
In sum, this paper empirically examines the effect of
the number of correspondent financial institutions at the
incorporation of the firms on their subsequent bankruptcy
risk. This paper is the first to empirically investigate how
the number of correspondent financial institutions affects
firm bankruptcy, and this paper is clearly distinguished
from the previous studies as it provides empirical
evidence on firm bankruptcy, focusing on firms just
after incorporation. We expect that more correspondent
financial institutions increase subsequent firm bank-
ruptcy risk because of the following two reasons.
First, previous studies such as Degryse and Ongena
(2001) and Castelli et al. (2012) show that an increase
in the number of correspondent financial institutions
reduces firm performance. This result suggests that the
higher the number of correspondent financial institu-
tions, the greater is the risk of subsequent firm
bankruptcy. Second, as new firms are very fragile,
the case of using only new firms corresponds to the
situation described in the theoretical model based on
Olson (1965) and Osborne (2003).2 This model
predicts that an increase in the number of correspon-
dent financial institutions increases the risk of firm
bankruptcy, and it is not unrealistic to assume that new
firms are frequently faced with the situation with high
risk of bankruptcy as shown by the model.
As expected, we find that more correspondent
financial institutions for SMEs at the first settlement
1 Mayer (1988) shows that banks play important roles in firms’
bankruptcy avoidance. Moreover, Hoshi et al. (1990), Grunert
and Weber (2009), Shimizu (2012), Gambini and Zazzaro
(2013), and Han et al. (2014) show the possibility that close
firm–bank relationships improve business performance and
prevent firms from going bankrupt.
2 For further details, see the ‘‘Appendix’’.
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of accounts increase the subsequent firm bankruptcy
risk. In addition, we obtain similar results when we
substitute amultiple bank relationships dummyvariable
for the number of correspondent financial institutions;
specifically, we find that multiple bank relationships
also increase subsequent firm bankruptcy risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the data used in this paper.
Section 3 presents the results of the regression anal-
yses. Section 4 checks the robustness of the results
obtained in Sect. 3. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Data
We use a unique firm-level data set collected by Tokyo
Shoko Research, Ltd. (TSR), one of the largest credit
reporting agencies in Japan. This data set comprises the
TSR Enterprise Information File, TSR Bankrupt
Information File, and TSR Manager Information File.
We target firms incorporated in Japan between April
2003 and December 2009 that are unlisted and have a
capital of less than 50 million yen.3 Moreover, we use
the data of the first settlement of accounts of these
firms, and in keepingwith the nature of the analysis, we
focus on firms that transact with at least one financial
institution and disclose information about profit at the
first settlement. In this paper, we define the number of
financial institutions recorded in the list of bank names
in the TSR Enterprise Information File as the number
of correspondent financial institutions for the firms.
Here, we elaborate on this data set. To begin with,
we classify the firms as either continuing or bankrupt
based onwhether they go bankrupt within 5 years from
the first settlement, and thus there are 2541 continuing
firms and 126 bankrupt firms. These 2667 firms
represent almost all of the firms that meet the above
data extraction conditions in the TSR Enterprise
Information File. Therefore, the bias associated with
sample extraction is likely to be small.Moreover, these
data are censored up to 5 years after the first settlement.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample firms,
and Fig. 1 shows the distribution of the number of
correspondent financial institutions. The firm age in
this table shows the age of each firm at the first
settlement and also represents the number of years
from establishment to incorporation. Although not
included in Table 1, we also obtain the following
information. First, for both continuing and bankrupt
firms, the minimum number of correspondent financial
institutions is one, whereas the maximum is nine. In
addition, the difference in the mean value of the
number of correspondent financial institutions between
the two groups is statistically significant at the 5 %
level. Moreover, as indicated in Fig. 1, the percentage
of continuing firms that transact with multiple banks is
44.4 %, whereas that of bankrupt firms that transact
with multiple banks is 54.0 %. The difference between
the two is also statistically significant at the 5 % level.
Hence, the firms that go bankrupt within 5 years from
the first settlement tend to have more correspondent
financial institutions than firms that do not go bankrupt.
On the other hand, the differences in the mean value of
the profit and the capital between the two groups are
statistically significant at the 10 % level, whereas the
difference in the mean value of firm age is not
statistically significant. Therefore, there is not much
difference in the characteristics between continuing
and bankrupt firms, except for the number of corre-
spondent financial institutions.
Furthermore, we also use the following aggregate
data for each prefecture: Nihon Kinyu Meikan (the
directory of Japanese financial institutions), published
byNihonKinyu Tsushin Sha; the Population Estimates,
published by the Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications; the Report on
Prefectural Accounts, produced by the Cabinet Office;
the Number of Prefectural Sorted Ordinary Corpora-
tion, published by the National Tax Agency; and
ORBIS, provided by Bureau van Dijk. These data
represent information about the prefectures where the
sample firms belong to at the time of the first settlement.
3 Empirical results
In this section, we use survival models and examine
the effect of the number of correspondent financial
institutions for SMEs at the first settlement on the
lifetime of the firms from their incorporation. From the
perspective of robustness, we estimate the effect using
both the Cox proportional hazards model and the
Weibull proportional hazards model. Table 2 shows
3 The date of establishment and that of incorporation do not
necessarily concur. In this paper, from the sample, we exclude
firms whose interval between establishment and incorporation
exceeds 30 years.
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the definition and the source of each variable, and
Table 3 details the descriptive statistics.4 The close
relationship industries, which we control as a covari-
ate, are a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is
classified into the business type that has many
opportunities to receive advice from its main bank or
0 otherwise, following Ogura (2007).5 In addition, the
credit rating, which we also control as a covariate, is
the indicator by which TSR comprehensively evalu-
ates the firms based on four criteria: qualifications of
the manager, growth potential, stability, and openness.
Higher ratings imply that the firm is a prime
enterprise.6 Industry and incorporation year dummy
variables are also included in the regressions.
In the analyses in this paper, odd columns show the
results when we use standard errors clustered by
prefecture and settlement year, while even columns
represent the results for the cases where we adopt
standard errors clustered by firm, i.e., heteroskedas-
ticity-robust standard errors.
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analy-
ses. Columns 1 and 2 show the regression results from
using the Cox proportional hazards model, and
columns 3 and 4 show those from the Weibull
proportional hazards model. As shown in columns
1–4, more correspondent financial institutions for
SMEs at the first settlement increase the subsequent
firm bankruptcy risk at the 5 % significance level
Table 1 Distribution of sample firms
Number of firms Number of correspondent financial
institutions
Profit (in millions of
yen)




Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Continuing firms 2541 1.667 1 0.733 0.200 0.007 0.004 5.402 0.990
Bankrupt firms 126 1.905 2 -5.317 0.203 0.008 0.005 4.689 1.990



















































































Fig. 1 Distribution of correspondent financial institutions
4 The minimum ‘‘time to bankruptcy’’ is -0.91, but the firm
that takes a negative value is only one out of 2667, and we
exclude this firm from the sample in the estimation. Moreover,
the minimum ‘‘firm age’’ and ‘‘time to the first settlement’’ are
also negative; however, the firms that take these values are very
few, and thus these samples scarcely affect the results of the
regression analyses.
5 Ogura (2007) uses a unique firm-level data set of unlisted
companies collected from the Survey of the Financial Environ-
ment of Enterprises, conducted by the Small and Medium
Enterprise Agency in October 2002, and classifies target
companies into two groups according to their business type.
While one group has many opportunities to receive advice from
their main banks, the other group has few opportunities to do so.
To clarify the difference in the strength of the relationships,
Ogura (2007) calls the former the close relationship industries,
and adopts this as a dummy variable. The close relationship
industries include wholesale, real estate, accommodation, some
service industries (e.g., food and beverage), manufacturing
(other than wooden products), chemical products, and electric
machinery and appliances.
6 In the four viewpoints, stability occupies 45 % of the total.
Therefore, this variable mainly indicates the stability of each
firm. In addition, stability is evaluated on owned capital,
financial transactions, collateral margins, etc.
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Table 2 Definition and source of each variable
Variable name Definition
(A) Definition
Time to bankruptcy Number of years from the first settlement of accounts to bankruptcy
Bankruptcy Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm goes bankrupt within 5 years of the first settlement
of accounts or 0 otherwise
Number of correspondent
financial institutions
Number of correspondent financial institutions of each firm
Multiple bank relationships Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm opts for multiple bank relationships or 0 otherwise
City bank Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the main bank of each firm is city bank or 0 otherwise
Regional bank Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the main bank of each firm is regional bank or 0 otherwise
Shinkin bank Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the main bank of each firm is Shinkin bank (Japanese small-
scale bank) or 0 otherwise
Capital Capital of each firm (unit: billion yen)
Firm age Age of each firm
Close relationship industries Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is classified into the business type that has many
opportunities to receive advice from its main bank or 0 otherwise
Profit Profit of each firm (unit: million yen)
Sales Sales amount of each firm (unit: thousand yen)
Manager age Age of the manager of each firm
Offices Employees Number of offices of each firm The number of employees of each firm
Male Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the manager of the firm is male or 0 otherwise
Credit rating Credit rating of each firm evaluated by Tokyo Shoko Research
Time to the first settlement Length of time from the incorporation to the first settlement of accounts
Herfindahl index of financial
institutions
Herfindahl index of the number of financial institutions in each prefecture
Financial institutions Ratio of the number of financial institutions in each prefecture to the number of ordinary
corporations
Population Population in each prefecture (unit: million)
GPP Real gross prefectural product in each prefecture (unit: trillion yen)
Ordinary corporations Number of ordinary corporations in each prefecture (unit: million)
Economic growth rate Growth rate of the real gross prefectural product in each prefecture












Firm age TSR Enterprise Information File (Tokyo Shoko Research)
Close relationship industries TSR Bankrupt Information File (Tokyo Shoko Research)
Profit TSR Manager Information File (Tokyo Shoko Research)
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when we use standard errors clustered by prefecture
and settlement year, whereas it is statistically signif-
icant at the 10 % level when we adopt standard errors
clustered by firm. Therefore, more correspondent
financial institutions do not work as insurance for
firms to avoid bankruptcy, as Detragiache et al. (2000)
show; on the contrary, it increases the risk of
bankruptcy, as other literature shows. As for other
covariates except for the number of correspondent
financial institutions in columns 1–4, the profit and the
economic growth rate are negatively associated with
subsequent firm bankruptcy risk, while capital is
positively associated with the risk.
Columns 5–8 represent the results when firms’
other information is added to columns 1–4. Indeed, the
sample size decreases slightly because of data limita-
tions, but there is a high possibility that the bias
associated with sample extraction is small. In columns
5–8, we also control covariates that may affect firm
bankruptcy, such as the number of offices and
employees, and include the credit rating as a covariate
that is a good predictor of the stability of firms. As
these columns show, more correspondent financial
institutions increase subsequent firm bankruptcy risk
at the 1 % significance level, regardless of the standard
errors. In addition, although the capital and economic
growth rate are statistically significant in columns 1–4,
these covariates are not statistically significant in
columns 5–8. In contrast, for all the firm age and the
Herfindahl index of financial institutions are not
statistically significant in columns 1–4, these covari-
ates are significant in columns 5–8. Furthermore, the
credit rating is also statistically significant in columns
5–8; this indicates that the rating expresses the risk of
firm bankruptcy well. Thus, the regressions in columns
5–8 can control the stability of firms to some extent.
In addition, Table 5 shows the results when we
substitute a multiple bank relationships dummy vari-
able for the number of correspondent financial insti-
tutions in Table 4. This table shows similar results to
those in Table 4; specifically, multiple bank relation-
ships at the first settlement also increase subsequent
firm bankruptcy risk. This indicates that the result in
Table 4 does not stem from the outliers in the sample
and that there is a huge difference between the impact
of a single bank relationship and that of multiple bank
relationships on the risk.
In sum, more correspondent financial institutions
for SMEs at their first settlement increase subsequent
firm bankruptcy risk, and multiple bank relationships










Time to the first settlement
Herfindahl index of financial
institutions
Nihon Kinyu Meikan (Nihon Kinyu Tsushin Sya)
Financial institutions Nihon Kinyu Meikan (Nihon Kinyu Tsushin Sya) and Number of Prefectural Sorted Ordinary
Corporation (National Tax Agency)
Population Population Estimates (Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications)
GPP Report on Prefectural Accounts (Cabinet Office)
Ordinary corporations Number of Prefectural Sorted Ordinary Corporation (National Tax Agency)
Economic growth rate Report on Prefectural Accounts (Cabinet Office)





In the previous section, we obtained the result that more
correspondent financial institutions for SMEs at the first
settlement increase subsequent firm bankruptcy risk.
However, we cannot deny the possibility that the result
is due to reverse causality. In other words, firms that are
likely to go bankrupt may tend to transact with more
financial institutions. In reality, at an individual level, a
person on the edge of bankruptcy tends to borrow
money from multiple lenders. Furthermore, some
studies also show the possibility of reverse causality;
for instance, Peek and Rosengren (2005) find that firms
in poor financial condition are more likely to receive
additional bank credit. In addition, Carletti et al. (2007)
show that less profitable firms usemultiple bank lending
more often than profitable ones. Hence, in this section,
we verify whether the results obtained in Sect. 3 are
from reverse causality. The possibility of reverse
causality in this paper may well result from the
correlation between the number of correspondent
financial institutions and firm weakness. Therefore, if
we solve the endogeneity between these two, we can
deny the causality that firms that are likely to go
bankrupt tend to transact with a greater number of
financial institutions. Hence, in this section, we consider
the possibility of reverse causality as the problem of
endogeneity and clarify the causality between the two.
In addition, in Sect. 3, we only partially control the
financial stability of correspondent financial institutions
with the credit rating, which is one of the covariates we
control. Some studies have argued that financial distress
of banks reduces their client firms’ investments (e.g.,
Gibson 1995; Minamihashi 2011). Thus, there is a
possibility that the financial health of correspondent
financial institutions affects firm bankruptcy.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable name N Mean Median SD Min Max
Time to bankruptcy 2667 5.554 5.980 0.863 -0.910 6.000
Bankruptcy 2622 0.035 0 0.185 0 1
Number of correspondent financial institutions 2667 1.678 1 0.946 1 9
Multiple bank relationships 2667 0.448 0 0.497 0 1
City bank 2667 0.221 0 0.415 0 1
Regional bank 2667 0.530 1 0.499 0 1
Shinkin bank 2667 0.216 0 0.411 0 1
Capital 2667 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.000 0.050
Firm age 2667 5.368 0.990 7.455 -0.010 30.000
Close relationship industries 2667 0.333 0 0.471 0 1
Profit 2667 0.447 0.200 16.632 -350.000 226.766
Sales 2622 161.459 56.681 454.028 0 9389.677
Manager age 2622 46.836 46.978 10.489 18.038 85.967
Offices 2622 0.477 0 1.447 0 23
Employees 2622 8.319 4 19.899 1 490
Male 2622 0.944 1 0.229 0 1
Credit rating 2622 45.193 45 4.929 16 66
Time to the first settlement 2622 0.749 0.980 0.455 -1.000 3.980
Herfindahl index of financial institutions 2667 0.120 0.104 0.073 0.035 0.322
Financial institutions 2667 0.935 0.957 0.359 0.388 1.901
Population 2667 5.077 3.793 3.955 0.596 13.048
GPP 2667 26.243 17.071 30.405 2.040 102.042
Ordinary corporations 2667 142.968 76.220 172.939 9.416 587.825
Economic growth rate 2667 1.338 1.482 2.461 -9.149 8.675
Startup rate 2667 3.204 3.118 0.982 1.063 7.018
The unit of sales is million yen
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Table 4 Results of regression analyses with survival models (with number of correspondent financial institutions)




























































































































































































































































































Given these considerations, we use the method of
instrumental variables (IV methods) to solve these
problems. However, IV methods are usually not used
in survival analysis; hence, we adopt instrumental
variables probit (IV probit) models and a linear
probability model (LPM) with the IV methods.7 In
other words, we analyze the effect of the number of
correspondent financial institutions for SMEs at the
first settlement on the probability of firm bankruptcy
within 5 years of the first settlement.
Here, we explain the instrumental variables used in
this paper. As previously mentioned, the number of
correspondent financial institutions is suspected to be
associated with weakness in firms and their correspon-
dent financial institutions. Hence, we use switching
cost, time to the first settlement, the number of offices,
and the number of employees as instrumental variables
because they may not be associated with weakness in
firms and their correspondent financial institutions, and
may not directly impact firm bankruptcy.
Switching cost is the cost involved in the
switching of firm–bank relationships, and it is likely
to be associated with the number of correspondent
financial institutions but not with weakness in firms
and their correspondent financial institutions. In this
paper, we use the product of—ln (financial institu-
tions) and the close relationship industries in Table 4
as the variable expressing the switching cost. The
number of financial institutions per firm in each
prefecture is negatively associated with the cost
involved in the switching; however, as suggested by
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992), the cost differs
depending on the strength of firm–bank relationships.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to use the product
Table 4 continued















































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log pseudo-
likelihood
-942.409 -942.409 -597.525 -597.525 -673.821 -673.821 -445.549 -445.549
Number of
observations
2665 2665 2665 2665 2620 2620 2620 2620
The upper rows are hazard ratios and the lower rows are standard errors
* Significant at the 10 % level
** Significant at the 5 % level
*** Significant at the 1 % level
7 The dependent variable in this case is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if the firm goes bankrupt within 5 years of the first
settlement or 0 otherwise.
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Table 5 Results of regression analyses with survival models (with multiple bank relationships dummy variable)


































































































































































































































































































































of these two variables as a proxy variable for the
switching cost.8
In addition, the time to the first settlement is a
continuous variable that shows time intervals between
the incorporation and the first settlement of firms, and
the unit of this variable is 1 year. In the sample firms,
even if the time of incorporation is the same, the time
to the first settlement is not necessarily the same. For
example, some of the firms’ time interval between
incorporation and the first settlement is 1 year, but it is
half a year for others. The longer the interval, the more
opportunities there are for firms to transact with many
financial institutions; thus, this variable is likely to be
positively associated with the number of correspon-
dent financial institutions but not with weakness in
firms and their correspondent financial institutions.
Furthermore, the number of offices and the number
of employees are also likely to satisfy the conditions of
instrumental variables because of the following rea-
sons: First, these variables in this paper are not widely
distributed, and thus these variables are highly likely
not to have a strong association with firm weakness,
not to mention weakness in their correspondent
financial institutions. For the same reason, these
variables may well not directly affect firm bankruptcy.
Finally, although the distributions of these variables
are narrow, they are supposed to have a certain
correlation with the number of correspondent financial
institutions.
Hence, in this paper, we adopt these four instru-
mental variables for the number of correspondent
financial institutions and examine the effect of the
number of correspondent financial institutions on the
probability of firm bankruptcy within 5 years of the
first settlement.
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the regression
analyses with the IV probit models; concretely,
Table 6 shows the result of using the maximum
likelihood estimation, and Table 7 shows the results of
using Newey’s (1987) two-step estimation. In Table 6,
column 1 shows the results when we use standard
errors clustered by prefecture and settlement year,
while column 2 represents the results when we use
Table 5 continued













































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log pseudo-
likelihood
-942.712 -942.712 -597.857 -597.857 -674.178 -674.178 -445.961 -445.961
Number of
observations
2665 2665 2665 2665 2620 2620 2620 2620
The upper rows are hazard ratios and the lower rows are standard errors
* Significant at the 10 % level
** Significant at the 5 % level
*** Significant at the 1 % level
8 In this paper, it is not to measure switching cost very
accurately but to find valid instrumental variables that matters,
and the product of these two satisfies the conditions of
instrumental variables. Thus, even if the product of these two
does not accurately correspond to the cost involved in the
switching of firm–bank relationships, it does not mean that the
product of the two is inappropriate as an instrumental variable.
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standard errors clustered by firm. As shown in these
columns, more correspondent financial institutions at
the first settlement increase the probability of firm
bankruptcy during 5 years from the first settlement at
the 1 % significance level. Moreover, although the
Wald tests of exogeneity are rejected at the 10 %
significance level, they are not rejected at the 5 %
significance level; hence, there is a high probability
that the number of correspondent financial institutions,
in this case, is not endogenous.
In addition, in Table 7, we obtain similar results as
in Table 6; specifically, more correspondent financial
institutions at the first settlement increase the proba-
bility of firm bankruptcy within 5 years of the first
settlement at the 5 % significance level, and the Wald
test of exogeneity is not rejected at the 5 % signifi-
cance level. Moreover, column A shows that the
coefficient on the credit rating is positive and signif-
icant. This indicates that the lower the risk, the more
the firms transact with financial institutions. Thus, this
Table 6 Results of regression analyses with IV probit models (maximum likelihood estimation)
(1) Clustered by prefecture and year (2) Clustered by firm
dy/dx Delta-method
SE




Ln (number of correspondent
financial institutions)
1.238*** 0.442 2.800 0.005 1.238*** 0.426 2.900 0.004
City bank 0.292 0.305 0.960 0.339 0.292 0.303 0.960 0.336
Regional bank 0.247 0.304 0.810 0.415 0.247 0.297 0.830 0.405
Shinkin bank 0.237 0.305 0.780 0.436 0.237 0.302 0.790 0.432
Ln (capital) 0.028 0.059 0.470 0.637 0.028 0.057 0.490 0.627
Ln (firm age ? 1) 0.058 0.041 1.420 0.157 0.058 0.046 1.260 0.209
Close relationship industries -0.152 0.116 -1.310 0.190 -0.152 0.121 -1.250 0.210
Profit -0.007*** 0.002 -2.980 0.003 -0.007*** 0.002 -3.210 0.001
Ln (sales ? 1) 0.008 0.027 0.280 0.783 0.008 0.029 0.260 0.796
Ln (manager age) 0.067 0.185 0.360 0.717 0.067 0.189 0.350 0.723
Male 0.017 0.203 0.080 0.933 0.017 0.214 0.080 0.937
Ln (credit rating) -1.883*** 0.310 -6.070 0.000 -1.883*** 0.372 -5.060 0.000
Prefectural characteristics
variables Herfindahl index of
financial
institutions
-5.170 3.232 -1.600 0.110 -5.170* 2.993 -1.730 0.084
Ln (financial institutions) -0.685 0.586 -1.170 0.243 -0.685 0.497 -1.380 0.168
Ln (population) -0.209 0.353 -0.590 0.554 -0.209 0.334 -0.630 0.532
Ln (GPP) 0.420 0.645 0.650 0.515 0.420 0.543 0.770 0.439
Ln (ordinary corporations) -0.633 0.753 -0.840 0.400 -0.633 0.611 -1.040 0.300
Economic growth rate -0.043 0.026 -1.630 0.104 -0.043** 0.020 -2.110 0.035
Startup rate -0.141 0.091 -1.550 0.120 -0.141* 0.081 -1.750 0.081
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Incorporation year dummies Yes Yes
Log pseudo-likelihood -1945.835 -1945.835
Wald test of exogeneity 0.070 0.064
Number of observations 2621 2621
* Significant at the 10 % level
** Significant at the 5 % level
*** Significant at the 1 % level
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result supports the causality that more correspondent
financial institutions increase subsequent firm bank-
ruptcy risk.
Table 8 shows the results of using the LPMwith the
IVmethods. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of using
two stage least squares (2SLS) estimators, and columns
3 and 4 show those of using the generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimators. This table also
shows that more correspondent financial institutions
increase the probability of firm bankruptcy, and the
Table 7 Results of regression analyses with IV probit models (two - step estimation)
(A) First-stage regression
Dependent variable: Ln
(number of financial institutions)
(B) Two-step probit with endogenous
regressors
Dependent variable: Bankruptcy





Ln (number of correspondent financial
institutions)
1.363** 0.581 2.350 0.019
Switching cost 0.052 0.045 1.150 0.249
Time to the first settlement -0.007 0.028 -0.240 0.809
Ln (offices ? 1) 0.070*** 0.021 3.330 0.001
Ln (employees) 0.079*** 0.011 7.180 0.000
City bank -0.116** 0.054 -2.160 0.031 0.322 0.339 0.950 0.342
Regional bank -0.151*** 0.050 -3.000 0.003 0.272 0.335 0.810 0.416
Shinkin bank -0.147*** 0.053 -2.790 0.005 0.262 0.343 0.760 0.446
Ln (capital) 0.027*** 0.009 3.020 0.003 0.031 0.063 0.490 0.621
Ln (firm age ? 1) 0.014 0.010 1.480 0.139 0.065 0.056 1.140 0.253
Close relationship industries 0.127*** 0.023 5.420 0.000 -0.167 0.150 -1.110 0.265
Profit 0.001** 0.001 2.420 0.016 -0.007*** 0.002 -3.560 0.000
Ln (sales ? 1) 0.013*** 0.004 3.200 0.001 0.009 0.027 0.320 0.750
Ln (manager age) -0.038 0.039 -0.970 0.331 0.074 0.223 0.330 0.741
Male 0.028 0.038 0.740 0.461 0.019 0.238 0.080 0.936
Ln (credit rating) 0.196** 0.083 2.360 0.018 -2.080*** 0.437 -4.760 0.000
Prefectural characteristics variables Herfindahl
index of financial institutions
0.582 0.458 1.270 0.204 -5.710* 2.916 -1.960 0.050
Ln (financial institutions) 0.216** 0.092 2.360 0.018 -0.756 0.582 -1.300 0.194
Ln (GPP) -0.031 0.100 -0.310 0.754 0.465 0.594 0.780 0.434
Ln (ordinary corporations) 0.110 0.114 0.970 0.333 -0.699 0.701 -1.000 0.318
Economic growth rate 0.007 0.004 1.630 0.104 -0.047** 0.023 -2.050 0.040
Startup rate 0.007 0.013 0.580 0.559 -0.155* 0.081 -1.910 0.056
Constant -0.820* 0.451 -1.820 0.069
Industry dummies Yes
Incorporation year dummies Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.116
Wald test of exogeneity 0.071
Number of observations 2621
* Significant at the 10 % level
** Significant at the 5 % level
*** Significant at the 1 % level


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































overidentifying restrictions tests are not rejected at the
10 % significance level in columns 1–4; thus, there is a
high probability that the number of correspondent
financial institutions, in this case, is not endogenous.
As shown in this section, which considers the
possibility of reverse causality and the problem of
endogeneity, we obtain the results that the increase in
the number of correspondent financial institutions
increases the risk of firm bankruptcy, and this result
corresponds to that obtained in the previous sec-
tion. Therefore, the results in the previous section have
a high level of robustness.
5 Conclusion
As indicated, more correspondent financial institu-
tions for SMEs at the first settlement increase the risk
of subsequent firm bankruptcy, and we confirmed the
causality between the two. This result corresponds to
previous empirical studies such as Degryse and
Ongena (2001) and Castelli et al. (2012), and the
theoretical studies by Olson (1965) and Osborne
(2003). This paper offers a new management strategy
to reduce the risk of firm bankruptcy in the early stages
of the entrepreneurial process. In addition, the enter-
prise information at the first settlement of accounts is
the very first piece of information about firms that we
can obtain. Hence, the findings in this paper indicate
the possibility that the number of correspondent
financial institutions at the first settlement functions
as an indicator of the future of young SMEs, and this
can also be useful to investors.
However, this paper only examines the effect of the
number of correspondent financial institutions for
SMEs at the first settlement on the subsequent firm
bankruptcy risk. Thus, this paper does not show that
more correspondent financial institutions always make
against SMEs. In fact, some studies have argued that
the number of correspondent financial institutions is
positively associated with firms’ growth opportunities
(e.g., Houston and James 1996; Farinha and Santos
2002). In addition, as previously mentioned, we target
only those firms that transact with at least one financial
institution and disclose information about profit at the
first settlement. Therefore, the impact on firms that do
not correspond to the above description remains
outside the scope of the analyses in this paper.
Moreover, as Beck et al. (2014) show, the lending
activities of financial institutions are related to busi-
ness cycles. Unfortunately, this is also beyond the
scope of this paper; hence, we need to deepen
discussions on the issues using more detailed data
over longer durations.
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Appendix
This ‘‘Appendix’’ describes the theoretical model to
show that the increase in the number of correspondent
financial institutions increases the risk of firm bank-
ruptcy. Let us assume the following case. The number
of correspondent financial institutions of a firm is
n and each financial institution has two strategies:
Support and Don’t support. Moreover, when the
number of financial institutions that choose Support
is w or greater, bankruptcy of the firm can be avoided,
where 1 B w B n. Furthermore, if bankruptcy of the
firm is avoided, then all n correspondent financial
institutions can obtain a benefit b.9 However, financial
9 In this case, b expresses the future margin of profits on lending
that the financial institutions can earn by avoiding the firm’s
bankruptcy.
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institutions that choose Support have to pay cost
c. Therefore, the net profits of the financial institutions
that choose Support are represented by b - c.10 On
the other hand, when the number of financial institu-
tions that choose Support is less than w, the firm goes
bankrupt. In brief, in this paper, we assume a
vulnerable firm whose bankruptcy largely depends
on whether it can receive support from its correspon-
dent financial institutions.
Next, we consider the Nash equilibrium in this
model. In this case, a group of correspondent financial
institutions is considered to be a temporary combina-
tion. Hence, in this case, it is appropriate to assume
that the Nash equilibrium is a symmetric one.
The case of w = 1, i.e., the state when a specific
financial institution chooses Support, is not the Nash
equilibrium because b C b - c. Hence, we consider
the Nash equilibrium while including a mixed strat-
egy, and assume the case where all correspondent
financial institutions choose Don’t support with the
same probability p, as in the Nash equilibrium.
Because of the fundamental principle of the mixed
strategy, the benefits when a correspondent financial
institution chooses Support with the probability of 1
and when it chooses Don’t support with the probabil-
ity of 1 have to be equal. When it chooses Support, the
benefit is b - c because the bankruptcy of the firm can
be avoided, irrespective of other correspondent finan-
cial institutions’ actions.11 If it chooses Don’t Support
while other correspondent financial institutions choose
Support, then it can gain benefit b. However, if all
other correspondent financial institutions also choose
Don’t support, the benefit is 0. In this case, the
probability that all other correspondent financial
institutions choose Don’t support is pn-1; hence, the
probability that at least one of the other correspondent
financial institutions chooses Support is 1 - pn-1.
Therefore, the condition for when all correspondent
financial institutions choose Don’t support with the
probability of p is the Nash equilibrium, shown in
Eq. (1) as follows:
b c ¼ 1 pn1 b: ð1Þ






To the contrary, when all correspondent financial
institutions choose Don’t support with this probabil-
ity, the expected profit of each correspondent financial
institution is b - c which is equal to the expected
profit in the case where a correspondent financial
institution chooses Support. As mentioned above,
there is no strategy available for any of the correspon-
dent financial institutions other than Support or Don’t
support; hence, the state where all correspondent
financial institutions choose Don’t support with the
probability of p ¼ c
b
  1
n1 is a unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, the probability that each
correspondent financial institution chooses Don’t
support increases with n because c
b
\1. In brief, the
probability that each correspondent financial institu-
tion chooses Don’t support increases with the number
of correspondent financial institutions. Furthermore,
the probability that all correspondent financial insti-







This probability also increases with n. Therefore,
the increase in the number of correspondent financial
institutions increases the free rider to other correspon-
dent financial institutions, and thus firm bankruptcy is
more likely to occur.
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